Boycotts Against China

[Sertorio]

Portugal and the UK also have one of the most longstanding alliances in the world.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Portuguese_Alliance

Which stopped being of any use to us around 1815...

?? 1815 or 1915?

1815, after the Napoleonic wars...Wellington was instrumental in getting Portugal rid of the French armies...

That's so, Sertorio. As the king of Portugal, family and court fled to the safety of Brazil the British placed some of their own army units there apparently to honour their old alliance with Portugal. I can se no other reason for it for for it. 1. Britain's armed strwength lie with its navy; not its army and 2. waging war on the Iberian penimsula contributed nothing obvious to final victory over Napoleon. But it would have loaned credability to the reputation of Britain as a country that honoured its alliances (i.e. it had some propaganda value).

The King of Portugal could not have realised that by placing General Arthur Wellesley (the name of the future Duke of Wellington) jointly in charge of the Portuguese army and the British expeditionary force present he had appointed a battlefield tacticial and military genuis par excellence. I believe that it even took the high command in London years to wake up to the man's merit.

Actually it deed. It were the British, Portuguese ans Spanish armies which fought the French in the Peninsula that finally invaded southern France and forced the first Napoleon abdication.

[neverfail]

That's so, Sertorio. As the king of Portugal, family and court fled to the safety of Brazil the British placed some of their own army units there apparently to honour their old alliance with Portugal. I can se no other reason for it for for it. 1. Britain's armed strwength lie with its navy; not its army and 2. waging war on the Iberian penimsula contributed nothing obvious to final victory over Napoleon.

Actually it deed. It were the British, Portuguese ans Spanish armies which fought the French in the Peninsula that finally invaded southern France and forced the first Napoleon abdication.

Well, I do not deny that the British led multinational force present in the southwest of France must have been a dire embarrasment for Bonaparte but suggest that while an embarrasment it was not the cause of his opting for exile in Elba. General Wellesley (he became the Duke of Wellington only after Waterloo) led his army over the Pyrenees on August 1813 after Napoleon had returned from Russia with his grand armee decimated; so Bonapartwe likely would have had decidedly a shortfall of reserves to block the mountain passes entry into France.

It was that 1812-13 Russia fiasco that led to his first abdocation. What amazes me is that when subsequently Bonaparte returned to the French mainland in 1815 the crowd who had governed France during his year of abscence had not only managed to assemble an army destined to prove larger and more professional than the allied forces who met his at Waterloo; but that so many French officers (and soldiers of lesser rank) were eager to follow him despite the fact that as the Russia misadventure proved the man was a loser who led armies to catastrophe.

[Sertorio]

That's so, Sertorio. As the king of Portugal, family and court fled to the safety of Brazil the British placed some of their own army units there apparently to honour their old alliance with Portugal. I can se no other reason for it for for it. 1. Britain's armed strwength lie with its navy; not its army and 2. waging war on the Iberian penimsula contributed nothing obvious to final victory over Napoleon.

Actually it deed. It were the British, Portuguese ans Spanish armies which fought the French in the Peninsula that finally invaded southern France and forced the first Napoleon abdication.

Well, I do not deny that the British led multinational force present in the southwest of France must have been a dire embarrasment for Bonaparte but suggest that while an embarrasment it was not the cause of his opting for exile in Elba. General Wellesley (he became the Duke of Wellington only after Waterloo) led his army over the Pyrenees on August 1813 after Napoleon had returned from Russia with his grand armee decimated; so Bonapartwe likely would have had decidedly a shortfall of reserves to block the mountain passes entry into France.

It was that 1812-13 Russia fiasco that led to his first abdocation. What amazes me is that when subsequently Bonaparte returned to the French mainland in 1815 the crowd who had governed France during his year of abscence had not only managed to assemble an army destined to prove larger and more professional than the allied forces who met his at Waterloo; but that so many French officers (and soldiers of lesser rank) were eager to follow him despite the fact that as the Russia misadventure proved the man was a loser who led armies to catastrophe.

Napoleon won 70 battles and lost 9 throughout his history... Quite a loser...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ ... _Bonaparte

As to events after the retreat from Russia:

There was a lull in fighting over the winter of 1812–13 while both the Russians and the French rebuilt their forces; Napoleon was able to field 350,000 troops. Heartened by France's loss in Russia, Prussia joined with Austria, Sweden, Russia, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal in a new coalition. Napoleon assumed command in Germany and inflicted a series of defeats on the Coalition culminating in the Battle of Dresden in August 1813.

Despite these successes, the numbers continued to mount against Napoleon, and the French army was pinned down by a force twice its size and lost at the Battle of Leipzig. This was by far the largest battle of the Napoleonic Wars and cost more than 90,000 casualties in total.

The Allies offered peace terms in the Frankfurt proposals in November 1813. Napoleon would remain as Emperor of the French, but it would be reduced to its "natural frontiers". That meant that France could retain control of Belgium, Savoy and the Rhineland (the west bank of the Rhine River), while giving up control of all the rest, including all of Spain and the Netherlands, and most of Italy and Germany. Metternich told Napoleon these were the best terms the Allies were likely to offer; after further victories, the terms would be harsher and harsher. Metternich's motivation was to maintain France as a balance against Russian threats while ending the highly destabilizing series of wars.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon# ... _Coalition

Not exactly what you thought...

[Milo]

That's so, Sertorio. As the king of Portugal, family and court fled to the safety of Brazil the British placed some of their own army units there apparently to honour their old alliance with Portugal. I can se no other reason for it for for it. 1. Britain's armed strwength lie with its navy; not its army and 2. waging war on the Iberian penimsula contributed nothing obvious to final victory over Napoleon.

Actually it deed. It were the British, Portuguese ans Spanish armies which fought the French in the Peninsula that finally invaded southern France and forced the first Napoleon abdication.

Well, I do not deny that the British led multinational force present in the southwest of France must have been a dire embarrasment for Bonaparte but suggest that while an embarrasment it was not the cause of his opting for exile in Elba. General Wellesley (he became the Duke of Wellington only after Waterloo) led his army over the Pyrenees on August 1813 after Napoleon had returned from Russia with his grand armee decimated; so Bonapartwe likely would have had decidedly a shortfall of reserves to block the mountain passes entry into France.

It was that 1812-13 Russia fiasco that led to his first abdocation. What amazes me is that when subsequently Bonaparte returned to the French mainland in 1815 the crowd who had governed France during his year of abscence had not only managed to assemble an army destined to prove larger and more professional than the allied forces who met his at Waterloo; but that so many French officers (and soldiers of lesser rank) were eager to follow him despite the fact that as the Russia misadventure proved the man was a loser who led armies to catastrophe.

Napoleon won 70 battles and lost 9 throughout his history... Quite a loser...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ ... _Bonaparte

As to events after the retreat from Russia:

There was a lull in fighting over the winter of 1812–13 while both the Russians and the French rebuilt their forces; Napoleon was able to field 350,000 troops. Heartened by France's loss in Russia, Prussia joined with Austria, Sweden, Russia, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal in a new coalition. Napoleon assumed command in Germany and inflicted a series of defeats on the Coalition culminating in the Battle of Dresden in August 1813.

Despite these successes, the numbers continued to mount against Napoleon, and the French army was pinned down by a force twice its size and lost at the Battle of Leipzig. This was by far the largest battle of the Napoleonic Wars and cost more than 90,000 casualties in total.

The Allies offered peace terms in the Frankfurt proposals in November 1813. Napoleon would remain as Emperor of the French, but it would be reduced to its "natural frontiers". That meant that France could retain control of Belgium, Savoy and the Rhineland (the west bank of the Rhine River), while giving up control of all the rest, including all of Spain and the Netherlands, and most of Italy and Germany. Metternich told Napoleon these were the best terms the Allies were likely to offer; after further victories, the terms would be harsher and harsher. Metternich's motivation was to maintain France as a balance against Russian threats while ending the highly destabilizing series of wars.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon# ... _Coalition

Not exactly what you thought...

Napoleon was such a brilliant tactician that you almost forget he was such a bad strategist.

[Sertorio]

That's so, Sertorio. As the king of Portugal, family and court fled to the safety of Brazil the British placed some of their own army units there apparently to honour their old alliance with Portugal. I can se no other reason for it for for it. 1. Britain's armed strwength lie with its navy; not its army and 2. waging war on the Iberian penimsula contributed nothing obvious to final victory over Napoleon.

Actually it deed. It were the British, Portuguese ans Spanish armies which fought the French in the Peninsula that finally invaded southern France and forced the first Napoleon abdication.

Well, I do not deny that the British led multinational force present in the southwest of France must have been a dire embarrasment for Bonaparte but suggest that while an embarrasment it was not the cause of his opting for exile in Elba. General Wellesley (he became the Duke of Wellington only after Waterloo) led his army over the Pyrenees on August 1813 after Napoleon had returned from Russia with his grand armee decimated; so Bonapartwe likely would have had decidedly a shortfall of reserves to block the mountain passes entry into France.

It was that 1812-13 Russia fiasco that led to his first abdocation. What amazes me is that when subsequently Bonaparte returned to the French mainland in 1815 the crowd who had governed France during his year of abscence had not only managed to assemble an army destined to prove larger and more professional than the allied forces who met his at Waterloo; but that so many French officers (and soldiers of lesser rank) were eager to follow him despite the fact that as the Russia misadventure proved the man was a loser who led armies to catastrophe.

Napoleon won 70 battles and lost 9 throughout his history... Quite a loser...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ ... _Bonaparte

As to events after the retreat from Russia:

There was a lull in fighting over the winter of 1812–13 while both the Russians and the French rebuilt their forces; Napoleon was able to field 350,000 troops. Heartened by France's loss in Russia, Prussia joined with Austria, Sweden, Russia, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal in a new coalition. Napoleon assumed command in Germany and inflicted a series of defeats on the Coalition culminating in the Battle of Dresden in August 1813.

Despite these successes, the numbers continued to mount against Napoleon, and the French army was pinned down by a force twice its size and lost at the Battle of Leipzig. This was by far the largest battle of the Napoleonic Wars and cost more than 90,000 casualties in total.

The Allies offered peace terms in the Frankfurt proposals in November 1813. Napoleon would remain as Emperor of the French, but it would be reduced to its "natural frontiers". That meant that France could retain control of Belgium, Savoy and the Rhineland (the west bank of the Rhine River), while giving up control of all the rest, including all of Spain and the Netherlands, and most of Italy and Germany. Metternich told Napoleon these were the best terms the Allies were likely to offer; after further victories, the terms would be harsher and harsher. Metternich's motivation was to maintain France as a balance against Russian threats while ending the highly destabilizing series of wars.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon# ... _Coalition

Not exactly what you thought...

Napoleon was such a brilliant tactician that you almost forget he was such a bad strategist.

You may very well be right, although some people would disagree. You may find the following interesting:

"Napoleon as a Military Commander: the Limitations of Genius"
https://www.napoleon-series.org/researc ... enius.html

Just to whet your appetite:

Russell Weigley argues a slightly different point in The Age of Battles. Weigley is concerned generally with the obsession of the European powers in gaining the destruction of the enemy's army in a single climatic battle. Weigley regards Napoleon as the most proficient strategist since Gustavus Adolphus in achieving this masterstroke and the battle of Austerlitz as its crowning achievement during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic epochs.

[neverfail]

Napoleon was such a brilliant tactician that you almost forget he was such a bad strategist.

Absolutely agreed!

Like the invasion of Russia; leading an army whose numbers are varyingly estimated to have been over 350,000; 500,000 or 600,000. One thing historians agree on was that it was huge. The column was too big and unwieldly to have been supplied using wagons and Russia yielded little to foragers; so the deeper into Russia it marched the more Napoleon's soldiers starved. Czarist Russian forces kept on retreating without engaging the Grande Armée drawing it ever deeper into the fastness of Russia. They were enticing it into a trap.

Russian forces engaged them in battle at the mega-battle of Borodino outside of Moscow but in my opinion did not need to. Arguably that was a costly Russian mistake. Just over a month later Bonaparte and army began their legendary retreat from Moscow and got caught up in a bitterly cold Russian winter. Only about 50,000 made it back out of Russia alive which means that hundreds of thousands of them must have perished along the way.

Those were hundreds of thousand of lost troops Bonaparte no longer had at his disposal for future campaigns. The pendulum of power had decidedly swung against him.

His monumental Russia overreach exposes the megalomaniac streak in him that ended up being his undoing.